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executive Summary
Sentara Healthcare (Sentara) is a not-for-profit health care system in Norfolk, Virginia. Sentara operates eight hospitals, manages approximately 400 physicians, and owns a health plan called Optima Health that has over 433,000 members. The health care system 
has not been interested in a closed delivery system, instead expressing commitment to a model of 
“relationships that work,” maintaining close ties with other non-owned health plans, physicians, 
and hospitals. 
integration can serve as a financial hedge
Sentara gets a third of its overall revenue from its health plan. They consider the health plan, the 
physician group, and the hospital as part of a “triangular hedge”—however reform affects payment 
models and the distribution of value within the health system, Sentara has some protection from 
the volatility of revenue experienced by a health care company operating only in one sector. 
integration enables experimentation
Sentara is consciously leveraging the overlap of those patients using Optima insurance and 
Sentara care delivery to experiment with some new payment models, bundling, etc. However, 
they do not necessarily see this as “practice” for full integration, but rather as innovations that 
could then be rolled out with other partners, both on the payer and care delivery side. 
local market’s past experiences with integration are a big factor in 
whether or not a health system has an appetite for integration
Sentara unwound a staff-model HMO in the ’90s and local physicians had historically not 
wanted to join closed groups. Sentara leaders also witnessed the physician tension and market 
chaos that Carilion Clinic in Roanoke experienced in their own attempts at integration. In any 
given market, these “local” experiences will often matter more than national “proofs of concept” 
in a health system’s desire to evolve towards integration.   
timing is critical to reaping the financial rewards of change
Changing too early or too late both have financial costs. There is money to be made right now 
in running the traditional hospital system well and in marketing insurance products allowed 
under current regulations. At the same time, Sentara is mindful they need to prepare for change 
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by piloting and experimenting with new payment models and care delivery models. Actually 
rolling these out in advance of regulatory requirements, however, would mean leaving money 
on the table. 
investing significant funds in wellness initiatives, including a $500-per-
employee rebate, has had a high rOi of $6 of benefit for every dollar 
invested
Compared to earlier programs with less financial incentives, the Mission: Health program has 
resulted in a high level of employee engagement and over 90% participation. Financial savings 
derive particularly from better management of the members with chronic disease.  
consumer-directed, high-deductible health plans have become more 
attractive to customers during the recession and are expected to be a 
big part of Optima’s future growth
While Optima provides consumer-directed, high-deductible health plans (CDHPs) to only 6% 
of its current customer base, this is the fastest-growing segment amongst Optima’s plans. Optima 
has taken several steps to explain and improve the value proposition to physicians, employers, 
and patients. For example, without clear pricing for procedures, patients cannot understand 
what their costs will be if utilizing a CDHP. In response, Sentara has developed a Web-based 
portal that will give a detailed price estimate within three days for any visit or procedure at the 
medical group or hospital. 
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Sentara HealtHcare
A case study series on disruptive innovation
within integrated health systems
This case study is composed of three sections. The first section examines Sentara Healthcare historically, 
focusing on how it developed into an integrated health care delivery system. The second section is a 
study of current innovative practices at Sentara Healthcare, many of which are most successful at an 
integrated health care provider. The final section focuses on what other integrated providers could learn 
from Sentara Healthcare’s path to integration and commitment to innovation. It also discusses how 
health care policy reform may best support the development of integrated health care delivery systems.
i. HiStOry and BackgrOund
Sentara Healthcare (Sentara) is a not-for-profit health care system headquartered in Norfolk, 
Virginia. Sentara’s mission is “to improve health every day” by offering health care at all levels, 
ranging from community health and primary care to hospital and nursing home services. Sentara 
operates 10 hospitals with an additional hospital under construction (see Appendix A).1 The 
system employs over 500 physicians and advanced care practitioners and manages seven nursing 
homes as well as home care and patient transport services. Finally, it owns a health plan called 
Optima Health.
Hospital roots
Sentara began as a regional, hospital-based health care system in southeastern Virginia. Its roots 
trace back to 1888 when the 25-bed Retreat for the Sick opened in Norfolk, Virginia. By 1958, 
the Retreat had grown to become Norfolk General Hospital, a 475-bed community hospital. In 
1972, Norfolk General merged with nearby Leigh Memorial Hospital to form Medical Center 
Hospitals. In 1986, Medical Center Hospitals adopted the Sentara name.
nursing homes: first foray into vertical integration (early 1980s)
In the early 1980s, Sentara acquired a few nursing homes in the Hampton roads area of 
southeastern Virginia. With its expanding hospital presence, it was becoming clear that the 
1  This count includes two hospitals acquired in mid-2010; these acquisitions were expected to be final by the second 
quarter of 2011.
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nursing facilities in the region were not able to provide the level of services Sentara 
hospitals needed at discharge. The nursing homes were individually owned-and-
operated, older facilities. Sentara bought and remodeled the nursing homes to bring 
them up to modern standards.
Owning nursing homes allowed Sentara to discharge patients more quickly and 
to reduce bounce backs and readmissions due to lapses in long-term care. One 
nursing home facility was created specifically for patients on ventilators. This facility 
operated at cost, as these patients require a lot of sophisticated care. However, the 
nursing home freed up capacity in Sentara hospitals and decreased overall cost of 
care for long-term care patients on ventilators. It also allowed for a much higher 
level of quality of care for these sick patients.
Today, Sentara owns seven nursing homes, three assisted living facilities, and one 
home care agency. Throughout its history, it has chosen to acquire facilities in order 
to ensure high-quality, sub-acute, and chronic care in support of patients as they are 
discharged from its hospitals.
increased vertical integration: Optima health plan (mid-1980s)
Integration protects revenues and position in market
Optima was created in 1982 when Sentara realized it would need its own health 
plan to protect its position in the marketplace. Anthem was and remains the biggest 
insurer in the state. Sentara believed that Anthem’s bargaining power regarding 
pricing would become too strong without robust competition. Ken Krakaur, 
senior vice president, Optima, and president, peninsula region, explained, “The 
decision to integrate into insurance and later into physician management also acts 
as a triangular hedge. As we do not know where money will flow in the future, 
integration serves as a hedge to protect revenues.”
In 1982, Sentara 
created its own 
health plan to 
protect its position in 
the marketplace.
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Experiment with a staff-model HMO
Optima began as an independent physician association (IPA)-model HMO.2  The 
health plan was co-sponsored by Sentara and two affiliates, Virginia Beach General 
Hospital (prior to its becoming a Sentara hospital) and Maryview Hospital (prior 
to its becoming a BonSecours hospital). 
In 1988, Optima Health bought a division of Maxicare, a staff-model HMO. 
Maxicare, a for-profit HMO, was founded in California and grew rapidly through 
acquisition during the 1980s. In the late 1980s, Maxicare ran into financial trouble 
after acquiring a number of small HMOs and struggling to manage their expenses. 
Sentara bought a regional HMO run by Maxicare that was being sold off to service 
Maxicare’s debts. Mary Blunt, vice president of Sentara Norfolk General Hospital, 
explained that, at the time, “We thought hospitals were going to be seen as cost 
centers and HMOs were going to make the money. But the market was not ready for 
that; we were trying to think of where the market was going but it never got there.”
In the Maxicare venture, the employed physicians were unable to manage 
expenses and were losing money. The Maxicare product was not attracting many 
customers while subscriber rates in the open-model HMO and PPO products were 
growing. In 1996, the MaxiCare HMO was shut down, and all customers were 
switched to Optima’s other plans.
Mix of product offerings
Optima now covers over 433,000 customers throughout Virginia, including 
10,000 Sentara employees. The health plan covers 269,000 commercial customers 
through its HMO, point of service (POS), PPO, and high-deductible health plans 
(HDHP). The HMO, POS, and PPO products are fee-for-service products; the 
HMO plan has the lowest monthly premium and the tightest provider network. 
The POS plan charges slightly more than the HMO and offers a larger physician 
network. The PPO product has the highest monthly premium, the largest physician 
network and better out-of-state coverage. Darleen Mastin, senior vice president and 
2 An IPA-model HMO is a health plan that contracts with a group of physicians, compensating 
them based on procedural and appointment volume. Patients in this type of plan see in-plan 
physicians with a reduced co-pay, but may see out-of-plan physicians with a greater co-pay. This is 
in contrast to a staff-model HMO, which is a health plan that employs salaried physicians. Patients 
in this type of plan only see physicians employed by the HMO, so their choice of doctors is far 
smaller compared with IPA-model HMO products.
Among Optima’s 
offerings, the HMO 
plan has the lowest 
monthly premium 
and the tightest 
provider network.
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chief operating officer of Optima, explained, “There is a 10–15% pricing difference 
between the HMO and PPO products and that is enough to get people to enroll 
in the HMO.” 174,000 customers are enrolled in the HMO plan, 35,000 in the 
POS plan, and 61,000 in the PPO plan. Approximately 17,000 of these HMO 
and PPO members are enrolled in consumer-directed, high-deductible health 
plans (CDHPs). Optima covers 12,000 Medicare patients and 150,000 Medicaid 
patients, which represents one-third of the overall Virginia Medicaid market. All 
plans feature open access in that patients are not required to select a primary care 
doctor and do not need a referral to see a specialist.
Growth and profitability
Optima health plan has grown by increasing sales to medium and small businesses 
in Virginia. Sentara executives were in agreement that their system does not make 
strategic hospital acquisitions for the sake of expanding the regional footprint of 
the health plan. In some cases, the health plan was offered in regions in Virginia 
in advance of hospital acquisitions in that region. For example, Optima had a 
significant market presence in Harrisonburg, Virginia prior to Sentara’s 2010 intent 
to merge with Rockingham Memorial Hospital. In other cases, Sentara acquired 
hospitals in regions in which the health plan was not present. The Potomac Hospital 
acquisition in northeast Virginia was in a region where the health plan is not offered. 
Hospital growth does not drive health plan growth, though it sometimes brings 
competitive knowledge of new regions.
In 2008, Optima grew its membership by 30,000. In 2009, it grew membership 
by 20,000. It has the second largest market share in the region, after Anthem. It 
has increased its growth rate since 2005, and expects to reach its goal of 500,000 
members in the next three to five years.
From inception until the mid-2000s, there was considerable year-to-year 
volatility in the health plan’s financial performance. In the mid-2000s, in an effort 
to become consistently profitable, the health plan focused on increasing revenues. 
The plan recruited more customers and increased premiums. On the expense side, 
Optima better managed expenses and improved chronic disease management. 
Through revenue and expense management, Optima achieved more consistent 
annual profits of approximately $50 million. In 2009, Optima brought in $987 
million in revenue, or 33% of Sentara’s overall revenue.
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growth through continuous hospital acquisition (mid-1980s 
and beyond)
Since 1998, Sentara has acquired six hospitals and built one hospital. Sentara’s 
hospital base began primarily serving southeastern Virginia, namely, a region called 
Hampton Roads. Its more recent acquisitions have expanded its hospital presence 
into northern and central Viginia (see Appendix A).
Each Sentara acquisition has continued to operate as an individual profit center. 
Sentara has brought management expertise as well as improvements in quality and 
cost control to each merger. “Each hospital is very much its own business unit, 
reporting to Sentara corporate for its profits and losses. We take out inefficiency 
and waste, eliminate redundancy, pursue better purchasing and pricing,” explained 
Howard Kern, chief operating officer. Chief Executive Officer David Bernd added, 
“We put hospitalists and intensivists on 100% of the time” in an effort to improve 
quality and manage costs. Sentara ownership rapidly moves hospitals to profitability, 
often within one or two years. Following Sentara’s acquisition of Obici and Potomac 
Hospitals, each was profitable within six to nine months.
Sentara corporate has also invested heavily in information technology (IT) at 
each of its hospitals. By August 2010, it had implemented an EPIC electronic 
medical record in seven of its eight hospitals. It had implemented an electronic 
intensive care unit (eICU) monitoring system in five of its hospitals and pharmacy 
management software in seven hospitals. Sentara leadership strongly believes that 
IT investment is the best platform for pursuing improvements in quality, safety, 
and efficiency.
Sentara medical group founded (late 1990s)
Sentara Medical Group (SMG) was established in 1995. Dr. David Maizel, 
executive medical director, SMG, explained, “The group started primarily as a 
defensive move to acquire primary care physicians to hedge against the emergence 
of managed care.” Other executives mentioned that the primary goal of integrating 
into physician management was to secure hospital admissions.
SMG grew gradually through acquisition of local practices and through 
acquisition of practices owned by hospitals it acquired. In the 1998 merger with 
Tidewater Health Care, Sentara acquired Virginia Beach Hospital and 40 providers, 
increasing the size of its provider group by 30%. From the late 1990s through the 
mid-2000s, SMG was composed of approximately 80% primary care physicians 
Sentara corporate 
has invested heavily 
in information 
technology at each 
of its hospitals.
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(PCPs) and 20% specialists. From 2007 to 2010, Sentara focused on employing 
specialists; its mix has changed to 55% PCPs and 45% specialists. Hiring has slowed 
recently, and leaders seem to agree that Sentara will not be focusing on acquiring 
more physician practices in the near future. At present, SMG’s 390 physicians and 
120 nurse practitioners (NPs), certified nurse anesthetists, and physician assistants 
(PAs) care for over 500,000 patients. SMG is the largest physician practice in 
Virginia. Physicians are practicing in 90 different locations, and practice sizes are 
generally smaller than those at other integrated health care providers.
A few leaders mentioned that Sentara would benefit from a different specialist 
mix to best match utilization of specialists by patients. They would like to have 
the most commonly used specialists, cardiologists, and orthopedic surgeons, but 
have minimal representation of these specialties in the medical group. In 2007 and 
2008, Sentara looked into acquiring cardiologists, but these practices were selling 
at high multiples. Some Sentara leaders also noted that there are too few NPs and 
PAs to help physicians, and that, in general, SMG physicians are not in the habit 
of delegating work to other medical professionals. Other leaders thought that the 
number of professional support staff was in the right range.
Physicians have joined SMG for a number of reasons. First, SMG provided 
security and less earnings volatility, as providers have been paid a salary based on 
productivity. Second, Sentara brought practice management expertise and its EMR 
to physician practices, which physicians value. Finally, Maizel explained, “Our 
physicians have enjoyed a 10–15% salary advantage in the marketplace. This is in 
contrast to most integrated delivery systems, where physicians take a pay cut for 
joining because the system manages their EMR and overhead.” Over the last 10 years, 
however, Sentara had believed it needed to offer a premium in order to compensate 
physicians for giving up the potential upside of their own private practices. 
Physicians at SMG are paid 100% on productivity. There have been discussions 
about creating performance metrics for both primary care physicians and specialists, 
but as Maizel explained: “We have very little information for most specialties on 
office-based standardization. There’s a real void out there. Performance metrics, 
especially for specialists, do not exist.”
SMG has always been an open practice, meaning that it contracts with Optima 
as well as outside insurers. Optima patients account for 22% of SMG’s volume. For 
these patients, by cost, 90% of their care is delivered in the office and 10% through 
the hospital. This split has been a focus at Optima, which, in an effort to reduce 
overall cost of care, actively manages patients with chronic disease.
Sentara Medical 
Group contracts 
with Optima as 
well as with outside 
insurers.
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21st century 
Cultural shift in physician values
Since 2000, health care costs and reform have been in the political spotlight. As 
a result, local physician values have begun a slow but gradual change. Physicians 
who had previously been resistant to salaried positions have been more willing 
to consider a salaried practice. Importantly, physicians have begun to accept that 
the fee-for-service model may become a fixed-fee model. Maizel explained, “The 
perception shift hinges on a single mantra: it’s no longer all about the doctor, it’s 
about the patient. Younger physicians especially want to practice medicine and are 
much more comfortable with a large group setting and a salary. It tends to be some 
of the older physicians who are not willing to pay for an EMR or take a salary and 
do not want to give up autonomy. The younger ones recognize the infrastructure 
benefits SMG offers: the EMR and connection with the hospitals.” SMG has found 
it easier to enter negotiations and hire physicians in the past few years. The price 
paid for physician practices has also been decreasing since a peak in the early 2000s.
Commitment to quality, safety and information technology
Sentara has differentiated itself through its commitment to information technology, 
which enables improvements in quality, safety and expense management. In 2005, 
it implemented a system-wide electronic medical record. Bernd explained, “The 
EMR improves quality, and I firmly believe that lowers overall cost of care. I see in 
our EMR a high rate of return from a quality, safety, and economic standpoint.” 
Sentara hospitals have garnered awards for low infection rates and have won national 
rankings for quality outcomes in heart disease and joint repair.
Preparing for regulatory changes
Conscious of regulatory pressures, Sentara has continuously explored cost-cutting 
opportunities. Regulatory changes in health care historically have resulted in 
payment cuts from Medicare and Medicaid, which leads to pricing pressure from all 
payers. The health care reform package passed in March 2010 proposed further cuts 
to Medicare and Medicaid fee-for-service payments and may switch to capitated 
payments in 2013 or beyond. While the reform package was being drafted, Sentara 
mapped out different financial scenarios. Modeling a universal health care scenario, 
it explored what its revenues would be if all payments were dropped to current 
Medicare rates. They found that revenues would fall 30% or $300 million. 
While the health care 
reform package 
was being drafted 
in Congress, Sentara 
mapped out different 
financial scenarios.
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Sentara responded by setting a goal of reducing expenses by $30 million every 
year from 2009 to 2011. The goal was met through a variety of cost-cutting measures, 
both big and small, from closing the obstetrics ward at its CarePlex hospital to 
dropping its promotional budget, ending payment of organizational dues for its 
employees, and cutting down on printing and paper supplies. Blunt said, “It sent a 
signal to physicians and all employees that cost cutting is in our future.” Sentara also 
created pilot programs that aimed to drop health care delivery expenses 30%. These 
business-model innovations are described in Section II.
From its beginning as two hospitals, Sentara has evolved into an integrated, 
quality-oriented delivery system. Michael Dudley, president of Optima, explained, 
“In addition to a health plan, physician practices, and hospitals, Sentara has nursing 
homes, home health care services, ambulance services, patient transport, long-term 
care facilities, a long-term acute care hospital, and community wellness programs. 
In a way, Sentara is more vertically integrated than many large integrated systems.”
ii. diSruptive pOtential Of preSent-day SyStem
This section will examine Sentara’s success in innovation and plans for future inno-
vation. First, we will explain how leaders at Sentara view innovation efforts. Next, 
we will discuss how Sentara has successfully implemented enabling innovations 
such as its electronic medical record. Third, we will examine successful disruptive 
innovations at Sentara, including innovations in quality, safety, and wellness (see 
Figure 2).3 Finally, we will discuss disruptive innovations currently in development, 
including changing pricing models and managing overall costs of care.
categorizing Sentara’s priorities and successes in innovation
Figure 1 classifies disruptive innovations into 10 categories. For each innovation, 
Sentara leaders judged how important they viewed the innovation to be and how 
much progress Sentara has made in pursuing the innovation.
3 Disruptive innovation is a term coined by Harvard Business School Professor Clayton Christensen, 
describing changes that improve a product or service in ways that the market does not expect, 
typically by lowering price or designing for a different set of consumers. It contrasts with sustaining 
innovation, a process of incrementally improving existing processes in ways that only serve the 
interests of existing customers. An enabling innovation is a new product or service that supports the 
disruptive process. An example of an enabling innovation is an information technology platform 
that allows a health care delivery company to decrease overall cost of care.
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elements of 
disruptive innovation
priority level
management’s  
assessment of progress
Cultivating a shared belief 
in quality guidelines and 
evidence-based medicine
Extremely High
Unified View
Advanced / Unified View
Focus on and achievement of  
quality benchmarks, national  
recognition for commitment to quality
Leveraging information 
and decision-making 
tools, including electronic 
medical records
Extremely High
Unified View
Advanced / Unified View
Successfully implemented EMR, eICU; 
Optima database linked to EMR  
platform to explore new business models; 
working now on real-time  
prompts to follow best practices
Engaging and incenting 
consumers to take health 
care out of exam room
Extremely High
Unified View
Some Progress / Unified View
Sentara employees effectively  
incented by wellness programs;  
rest of community and patients at  
hospitals and SMG not included yet
Using effective case 
management to reduce 
illness and emergencies
Valued
Unified View
Some Progress / Divergent View
Optima leveraging case management 
abilities; Sentara Medical Group  
and hospitals working on it, at early/ 
pilot stages of implementation
Building connections 
across continuum of  
care for better chronic 
disease management
Valued  
Unified View
Little Progress / Divergent View
Small pilots are bringing hospital,  
PCP, and specialist together to manage 
chronic disease; Optima further  
along in managing chronic disease
Thinking of the  
health of populations 
rather than individuals
Valued  
Unified View
Little Progress / Divergent View
Talking about it, but more  
implementation needs to occur
Ensuring everyone 
practices to top of license
Valued  
Unified View
Little Progress / Divergent View
Most believe physicians do all tasks, 
including ordering scans, and there is little 
being done to encourage use of registered 
nurses (RNs) and PAs; some believe that 
there is interest in hiring more support staff
Managing overall cost  
of care, and not depart-
mental profit and loss
Somewhat Valued 
Unified View
Little Progress / Divergent View
Sentara hospitals have individual  
profit centers; small pilots exploring  
overall cost of care; consistent view  
that Sentara will wait for payment  
reform before progressing in this area
Moving standard care 
to most cost-effective 
venues (e.g. retail clinics, 
employer sites, e-visits)
Somewhat Valued 
Divergent View
Less important; 
some perceive as 
important
Little Progress / Unified View
Hospital-based system—care mostly at 
hospitals or specialist offices; no e-visits, 
as they are difficult to implement within 
current payment/incentive structures
Allowing caregivers  
to focus more efforts  
on sicker patients
Somewhat Valued 
Unified View
Little Progress / Unified View
Figure 1  Sentara’s priorities and successes in innovation
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The table on the previous page shows that leaders are unified in valuing and 
pursuing innovations in infrastructure and information technology. Executives 
are also unified in supporting the importance of taking health out of the exam 
room. Furthermore, leaders believe that Sentara has made strides in this latter area 
through its wellness programs. Leaders’ views diverge regarding the importance of 
pursuing pricing and business-model innovation. For example, when discussing 
moving care to more cost-effective venues, some leaders believed that “e-visits are 
not good medicine” while others said they were performing successful e-visits for 
prior employers. Still others explained that they had no way of being reimbursed 
for e-visits. When discussing the issue of ensuring that professionals practice to the 
top of their licenses, some leaders commented that Sentara Medical Group has an 
extremely low ratio of registered nurses (RNs) and PAs to physicians. These leaders 
believed that practices could be more efficient if more RNs and PAs were used. 
Leadership also expressed divergent responses to managing departmental profit and 
loss. Each hospital is evaluated by its bottom line, but leaders mentioned that this 
creates problems when trying to decrease cost of care across Sentara’s organization.
enablers of innovation: culture, emr, and health plan database
Culture: embracing experimentation and organization-wide learning
Sentara Corporate has funded infrastructure investment (i.e., EMR) and pilot 
studies that explore business-model innovation. It incubates teams such as the 
Clinical Innovations Work Group, which is composed of representatives from 
corporate, hospitals, SMG, and Optima. This work group is creating business-model 
pilots that are experimenting with new compensation models aimed at lowering 
overall costs of care. Individuals are encouraged to act as “champions” to steer 
pilots towards success. Sentara minimizes risks for these champions. For example, 
Sentara guarantees salary floors for physicians who participate in fixed-fee-payment 
pilots. Sentara also does not lay off employees if a new venture fails but will move 
them to different divisions instead. Profits from successful innovations are shared 
across participating divisions. Each year, Optima gives bonuses to Sentara hospitals 
for meeting quality benchmarks and managing chronic disease; in 2009, Optima 
awarded the hospitals $8 million. Dr. Gary Yates, senior vice president and chief 
medical officer, explained, “The board grades the top 100 managers as a team, so we 
work together.” Dudley added that Sentara-wide teamwork and learning “creates a 
barrier to entry of our [insurance] competitors moving into integrated health care.”
Sentara does not 
lay off employees if 
a new venture fails 
but will move them
to different divisions 
instead.
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“Culture is the cornerstone of innovation,” explained Bernd. The CEO has 
encouraged growth from within, as well as risk-taking and learning from failures. It 
is common for employees to work for Sentara for decades across multiple divisions. 
Blunt related that “There is a wide breadth of opportunities; you can experience a lot 
of different things. It is a good way for Sentara to motivate and retain talent.” Such 
exposure may create executives with greater managerial insight. Maizel explained, 
“One of the great things about this organization is [that] if you can show the pilots 
work, [Sentara] will do it. I can see certain pilots spreading out through the entire 
organization if they show cost-effectiveness and quality improvements.”
The culture of experimentation at Sentara is also influenced by leaders who 
have managed care backgrounds, including: Dr. Yates, senior vice president and 
chief medical officer;  Mark Szalwinski, vice president, peninsula region; Dr. 
George Heuser, vice president and medical director, Optima; and Michael Dudley, 
president, Optima. These leaders have contributed their experience in managed care 
to help colleagues conduct scenario planning for possible regulatory changes, as well 
as to design the business-model pilots.
Electronic medical record
Beginning in 2005, Sentara began investing in a system-wide electronic medical 
record (EMR) system: eCare. The eCare system required a $67 million capital 
investment for six hospitals and 300 Sentara Medical Group physicians, plus 
additional operating expenses for work process redesign, implementation, and staff 
training. By the beginning of 2011, seven of Sentara’s eight hospitals and most of 
its Medical Group practices will be linked to its eCare system. Sentara’s eCare links 
to all points of care: nursing homes, hospitals, hospital pharmacies, ambulances, 
Optima, and all Sentara Medical Group primary care and specialist physicians. 
Patients can access the EMR through a portal called MyChart. They can make 
appointments, check lab results, and follow up with their care providers. Initially, 
Sentara tried to offer Optima members the benefit of using MyChart for free, while 
all other patients had to pay to use the portal. Physicians did not like charging 
some patients to use the portal, as they perceived the arrangement as unfair. 
Sentara therefore allowed all patients free access to MyChart; as a result, adoption 
is exceeding expectations.
The extent of the Sentara EMR has set Sentara apart from other health care 
providers. “The EMR is a game changer, it makes working here different, that we 
will try things that big. We have talent, deep pockets, buffering systems, as well as 
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human capital and financial reserves to absorb potential adverse consequences,” 
explained Szalwinski. The EMR has been a platform for improvements in quality 
and efficiency. Since implementation, hospitals reduced pharmacy fill times from 
an average of 132 minutes to an average of 35 minutes. Sentara contracted with 
LYNX medical systems to improve coding and revenue generation in its Emergency 
Departments (EDs). LYNX used Sentara’s EMR data and found that EDs were 
undercoding. Sentara corrected its coding to reflect its patient mix and increased 
ED revenues by $30 per patient.
Kern explained that the EMR also serves as a platform for ongoing innovation: 
“For example, we want a heart failure patient’s weight gain to trigger a prompt 
that the physician order more diuretics. If the physician does not respond, the 
EMR will trigger a prompt further up the chain. We are trying to create real-time, 
evidence-based management systems. We want to take the EMR to the next level.” 
In addition to real-time, clinical decision support, Sentara leaders hope to develop 
an EMR that will improve care pathways, standardize care, and improve quality and 
patient satisfaction.
In addition, current pilot studies in business-model innovation rely heavily on 
reporting outcomes and cost information. The EMR, linked to Optima’s information 
systems, allows Sentara to follow the quality, outcome, and cost implications of 
these pilots.
Optima health plan database
Integration into insurance has provided Sentara with a database of claims and 
outcomes data. It developed this system in-house because leadership was convinced 
that the data could help them improve quality and efficiency. Dudley explained 
that developing the database internally has created an excellent product. “We went 
down to actuaries at a large, national insurance company and showed them our 
data. They acknowledged we had very good data and analysis that superseded many 
national insurers.”
For example, when Sentara started tracking HEDIS4 data in-house, Optima 
saw that CT and MRI utilization for its patients was growing 12–20% year over 
year. Optima instituted a pre-authorization requirement for all CT and MRI 
4 Healthcare effectiveness data and information set: performance measurement tool run by National 
Committee for Quality Assurance.
“The EMR is a 
game changer, it 
makes working here 
different, that we will 
try things that big.”
—Mark Szalwinski, 
VP, peninsula region
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scans. Utilization decreased the first year, then increased with additional clinical 
indications, but at a slower rate. For Sentara, this intervention improved safety by 
eliminating unnecessary scans and lowered costs.
The Optima database is currently informing the business-model pilots Sentara 
is running. It helps determine how to price new insurance products and bundled 
payments, how revenues can be shared among hospitals and physicians, and how 
best to manage chronic disease. The database is therefore rich in financial, quality, 
and outcomes data and serves as a platform from which to launch innovations.
disruptive innovations: wellness, quality and safety, eicu, high 
deductible health plans, hospital-within-a-hospital
Wellness
Sentara has launched two employee wellness programs. The first, Healthy Edge, 
started in 1994 and is a voluntary program that provides fitness and nutritional 
education to more than 10,000 Sentara employees. Healthy Edge gives small rewards 
such as T-shirts for meeting fitness or health goals. Director of Community Health 
and Prevention Terrina Thomas explained, “All of our programs are incentive-based. 
We know it helps people to participate.”  
Sentara launched another employee wellness program, Mission: Health, in 
2008. The program was created to be more interventional and to have greater 
monetary incentives under the Healthy Edge umbrella of programs and services. 
Employees who enrolled were assessed on five criteria: weight, cholesterol, blood 
pressure, smoking status, and how frequently they exercise. Thomas explained, “We 
have had a very high level of participation in Mission: Health. The Healthy Edge 
program had moderate participation, but Mission: Health has had more than 95% 
participation for completion of the personal health profile. Virtually everyone is 
signing up.”
All employees who are healthy on at least four out of five measures are given an 
automatic reduction on their monthly health insurance premium. All employees 
who score healthy on less than four measures are assigned a health coach. The 
employee, in consultation with their coach, sets goals in the five wellness areas. 
Employees who continue to meet with the coach are given the same rebate on their 
premiums as those who are healthy on four or five measures. Finally, employees who 
have a chronic disease are invited to join a specialized disease management program. 
Thomas said, “These employees get more money than others if they participate. At 
Sentara has 
launched two 
incentive-based 
employee wellness 
programs.
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first, others complained that the sicker employees got higher rebates than the well 
employees. But, once we showed overall program savings, we proved that Sentara-
wide costs were reduced and people stopped complaining.”
Thomas and the Mission: Health program managers initially thought they 
would hire internal patient service coordinators (PSCs) to run the life coaching 
and chronic disease management arms of Mission: Health. As Thomas explained, 
“Suddenly, we had 9,000 people who wanted to be managed and three full-time 
PSCs. Our regular PSC staff manages a maximum of 500 patients per employee. 
So, we searched for a vendor and found that Healthyroads was clinically qualified 
and more cost-effective. They now provide our health coaching services.”
Optima’s management of chronic diseases for Mission: Health and the rest of 
its insured population has improved with time. Thomas recalled, “Our prevention 
teams were working in silos. If you were a pregnant diabetic who smoked, you had 
three different case managers calling you. Now there is one cross-trained person. 
We were saying the patient was the center of the universe but that was not the case.”
Sentara Corporate committed more than $500 to each employee in premium 
reduction incentives to participate in the Mission: Health initiative. Employees 
with targeted chronic diseases or who were pregnant at the time were eligible for 
additional incentives worth $460 per year. The program began in 2008, and medical 
costs were greater than expected that year. An analysis of the data indicated that cost 
increases came from employees starting to address previously untreated conditions 
with medication and doctor’s visits. By 2009, significant clinical improvements were 
recorded across risk factors, especially for the group of patients with chronic disease. 
Compared to a predicted annual 8–10% rise in costs, or a $4.2 million increase 
over two years, costs rose only $1.28 million over those two years, saving almost 
$3 million dollars. Health care costs for the members of the disease management 
group dropped by 37% per employee (not including pharmacy costs). Every dollar 
invested in the program returned $6 in savings.5 The savings were found in reducing 
hospital admissions, decreasing ancillaries, decreasing the use of the emergency 
room for non-emergency care, and increased compliance with prescriptions. 
Overall, Dudley observed that Mission: Health has successfully “managed disease 
conditions and avoided disease crises.” Dr. Heuser added, “The value in Mission: 
5 Data cited is from Sentara’s white paper “Wellness Payoff: Sentara Healthcare and its Mission: 
Health”; study design and data were reviewed and validated by AonHewitt. 
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Health is in the management of patients with chronic disease. That is where we see 
direct, significant return on investment. The incentives get everyone to join, but 
the real benefit is in connecting with patients who have significant diseases we can 
manage.” In addition, the program increased wellness throughout the organization 
and encouraged individuals to be engaged in promoting their health.
Sentara has made wellness programs a priority for the long-term for the Optima-
insured population of Sentara employees. Wellness and preventive programs in 
the community are frequently not cost-effective, explained Thomas, nor are they 
cost-effective in a population insured for the short-term. The average commercial 
customer is with Optima for five years; the average Medicaid customer is with 
Optima for six months. The average Sentara employee frequently stays with the 
company for decades, providing incentives for the company to manage wellness.
Quality and safety
Sentara hospitals have been the primary focus of numerous successful quality and 
safety initiatives (see Figure 2). The hospitals began a Culture of Safety initiative 
in 2002 in an effort to decrease adverse events, including nosocomial (hospital-
acquired) infections. Nosocomial infections in the United States are thought to 
cause up to 100,000 deaths annually and cost approximately $5 billion to treat. The 
Culture of Safety initiative requires all caregivers to follow rules based on Behavior 
Based Expectations (BBEs). Caregivers work as a team to implement best practices 
when performing procedures (e.g., inserting central lines) and identifying and 
addressing problems. As a result, Sentara has seen an 81% reduction in serious 
safety events between 2003 and 2010.
Sentara also tracked infection rates in its hospitals and documented huge 
reductions in this area due to its Culture of Safety initiative. Across Sentara hospitals, 
rates of central line-associated infections decreased 93% from 2002 to 2009. Sentara 
Williamsburg Regional Medical Center has had no cases of ventilator-associated 
pneumonia (VAP) in six years.
Monthly, there is a system-wide patient safety meeting. A recent meeting 
examined whether patients were getting unnecessary radiation due to overutilization 
of scans in the emergency room. Bi-weekly clinical effectiveness councils have been 
created that bring together physicians and operations personnel. These councils look 
at how Sentara hospitals are managing their most complex and costly patients, such 
as those with heart failure or sepsis. The IT department helps physicians and leaders 
track and evaluate safety trends, and departments work together to put together 
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protocols and checklists to manage patient care. “At the councils, we ask whether 
there are any breakdowns in communication—do we have the right order sets, 
how do the admitting physicians leverage hospitalists and intensivists?” explained 
Natalie Kaszubowski, vice president of information systems. “We’re trying to create 
a high reliability organization,” she added. The goal is to standardize care of the 
sickest patients, improve care process flow, and thereby improve outcomes while 
lowering cost.
“Resistance Kills/Save Antibiotic Strength” was a program developed by Optima 
and then expanded to be system-wide. In the hospitals, pharmacists, physicians, 
and nurses worked together to achieve a 13% reduction in antibiotic prescriptions 
in five months. Bernd explained that the benefits of the safety and quality initiative 
are many; once they generate data supporting quality improvements, “physicians 
will follow, customers will follow, and payers will follow.”
Optima has launched disease management initiatives that have improved quality 
and lowered costs. One successful initiative significantly reduced days of school 
innovation measurable success matrices
Wellness (Mission: Health) • 98% participation rate
• $6 returned for every $1 invested
Quality and safety: 
Culture of safety
Save antibiotic strength
Asthma
Sickle cell crisis
• 100% decrease in ventilator-associated 
infections in some hospitals
• 93% decrease in central line infections
• Decreased antibiotic prescriptions by 13% 
in 5 months
• Improved school attendance
• Decreased readmissions
eICU • 12% decrease in length of stay
• 25% decrease in mortality rates
Hospital-within-a-hospital • Improved outcomes in cardiac care
• Instituted care algorithms in cardiac surgery 
and heart failure
Consumer-directed, high-deductible  
health plans
• Fastest growth of all Optima plans
• Lowest monthly premium of all Optima 
plans
• Increasing price transparency at local 
hospitals
Figure 2  Successful disruptive innovations at Sentara
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missed in its pediatric asthmatic population from over 10 days per year to none. 
Sentara was awarded the National Environmental Leadership Award in 1995 by 
the Environmental Protection Agency for their asthma initiative. Another initiative 
reduced hospital readmissions in sickle cell patients. Senior Vice President of 
System Development Vicky Gray explained, “Representatives from the health plan, 
hospitals, and home care department got together, and it turned out that hydration 
at home was really important in breaking the cycle of crises. We were able to prevent 
constant hospitalization in these patients.” The program provided far better quality 
and outcomes, but it turned out not to be cost-effective and was not continued. 
Gray explained that they are beginning to explore creating care standards “across all 
facilities.” The integrated nature of Sentara allows them to come up with system-
wide solutions that will improve care. The “siloed” disease management programs 
that Thomas mentioned were rolled into a comprehensive, integrated Clinical Care 
Services program. The content and outcomes are preserved, but they are delivered 
in a patient-centric method rather than using a disease-centered methodology, and 
access all family members as appropriate.
Electronic ICU 
In 2000, Sentara implemented their eICU on a pilot basis in 35 beds at Norfolk 
General and Hampton General Hospitals. The intensive care unit (ICU) houses the 
sickest patients in the hospital and, on a per diem basis, the most costly patients. 
Sentara leadership recognized that closer ICU monitoring might lead to better 
outcomes and shorten length of stay in the ICU.
eICU aggregates all bedside monitors—patient vitals, telemetry (cardiac 
monitoring), oxygen saturation, video cameras, and two-way conferencing—at 
a central station in the ICU. Nurses and intensivists can monitor the data on a 
real-time basis. Alerts prompt staff to give medication or to respond if a patient is 
becoming unstable. The electronic monitoring ensures that care meets standards, 
protocols are followed, and allows communication among caregivers in real time. 
In the first year of use, the eICU system demonstrated consistent improvements 
in quality and reductions in cost. An independent evaluation showed that ICU 
mortality rates fell 25% at Norfolk General and the average length of stay fell 17%. 
eICU created an estimated cost savings of $2,150 per patient by increasing ICU 
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capacity and reducing patient expenses.6 eICU is now implemented in 10 ICUs in 
five Sentara hospitals. 
Based on eICU’s success in managing length of stay and measuring outcomes, 
Sentara is exploring managing post-acute care through advanced monitoring. The 
goal is to transfer patients from the step-down unit, which has a nurse-to-patient 
ratio of 4 :1, and onto the med/surgery floor, with a nurse-to-patient ratio of 8:1, 
earlier. Patients are monitored with real-time vitals, telemetry, video cameras and 
two-way communication.  The monitors prompt nurses, hospitalists and surgeons 
to administer medication and follow protocols.  The monitors are also color-coded: 
green indicates healthy vitals, yellow indicates troubling vitals, and red indicates 
that a patient needs prompt attention. The pilot study is tracking whether prompt 
attention to patients who enter the yellow zone will prevent codes (when a patient’s 
heart stops or when a patient stops breathing). 
Hospitals-within-a-hospital and freestanding emergency departments
Sentara Heart Hospital was opened at Norfolk General Hospital in 2006. The 
hospital performs 2,000 cardiac surgeries annually in five combined operating 
rooms (ORs) that are set up to transition from a minimally invasive, interventional 
procedure to a surgical procedure. U.S. News & World Report’s Best Hospitals Survey 
ranked Sentara Heart Hospital 43rd in the nation for heart surgery in 2010. 
Sentara invested $96 million in the design and implementation of the Sentara 
Heart Hospital. Blunt explained that the heart hospital lost a considerable amount of 
money in the first few years of operation. Investment in infrastructure and payments 
to cardiologists and cardiac surgeons far exceeded revenues in the first few years of 
operation. It is now beginning to recoup costs. In 2010, Sentara Norfolk General and 
Sentara Virginia Beach General hospitals combined their cardiac surgical programs. 
They previously had the same surgeons but now have the same surgical teams as 
well. This change was made to cut costs and improve quality and consistency in 
usage of protocols and best practices.
Blunt noted that the heart hospital would have been better served by combining 
cardiac and vascular care within one center. Currently, Sentara operates multiple 
stand-alone vascular care centers and multiple cardiac units in other hospitals, which 
6 From www.Sentara.com (9/12/2002) http://www.sentara.com/News/NewsArchives/2002/Pages/
eicu_model_for_icu_care.aspx
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feed Sentara Heart Hospital some of the time. She suggested that if all cardiac and 
vascular procedures were centralized, there might be infrastructure and cost savings 
across the system.
Sentara’s long-term acute care hospital (LTAC) occupies a floor of Norfolk 
General. The LTAC is an entirely separate cost center from the hospital. It contracts 
with Norfolk General to pay for all services used at the hospital, such as diagnostic 
tests. Patients must be discharged from the hospital and admitted to LTAC and 
vice versa. The LTAC realizes efficiencies in contracting out some elements of care. 
The hospital receives benefits in discharge planning; being so close to the nursing 
home allows the hospital to be able to manage and plan for capacity changes. Blunt 
explained, “The presence of LTAC saves Norfolk General $4–5 million a year due 
to better execution of discharges.”
Sentara has three freestanding emergency departments (EDs). It built two and 
inherited one when it merged with another hospital. Blunt explained that the EDs 
are a “great concept. They work for the consumer and work for the hospital. They 
are a walk-in, walk-out business and they exceed all expectations. They beat financial 
metrics really fast, on volume and efficiency and cost of service.” When the EDs 
were originally built, there was concern over whether they would be taking volume 
away from Sentara hospital EDs. Instead, the freestanding EDs have absorbed 
excess capacity from the community.
Consumer-directed, high-deductible health plans (CDHPs): multiple 
avenues to increase adoption
Approximately 6% of Optima’s commercially-insured members are enrolled in 
a consumer-directed, high-deductible health plan (CDHP). This product is a 
different type of HMO or PPO plan, where the health benefits can be combined 
with a health savings account (HSA) or an employer-funded health reimbursement 
arrangement (HRA). 
CDHP is the fastest growing segment of Optima’s commercially insured plans. 
CDHP enrollment grew by more than 40% from year-end 2009 through the third-
quarter of 2010. In contrast, enrollment in Sentara’s other commercially insured 
HMO/PPO plans grew by less than 4% during that same time period. Historically, 
the market in Virginia has been dominated by open (non-staff-model) HMO and 
PPO plans. The financial environment following the 2008 recession has driven 
customers to change their concerns. According to Optima’s Director of Strategic 
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Business Development Steve Cindrich, many customers are now focused on “price, 
price, and price.” In recent years, rising health plan costs have resulted in benefit 
design changes that shift more costs to employees. Due to higher deductibles, CDHP 
offers some of the lowest monthly premiums of all of Optima’s commercial plans.
There are a number of barriers to continued growth in the CDHP market, however. 
Cindrich says that some employers find the product confusing. It takes considerable 
education time to explain the advantages of CDHP and how it works for employees. 
Another barrier to adoption occurs at the physician’s office. The average physician 
practice collects payments in 30 to 60 days. If a patient with a CDHP with a $3,000 
deductible undergoes a $500 procedure, the patient may not have the money to pay 
that bill at the point of care. In contrast, if the patient had a PPO or HMO with no 
deductible, the insurer would pay the doctor within the traditional 30-to-60-day 
window. Many medical providers are therefore concerned about the impact CDHP 
will have on their ability to collect timely payments from patients.
Incenting employers to adopt CDHP through financing flexibility 
and education 
To encourage adoption of CDHP, Optima visits with employers and explains 
to them the inherent flexible funding options of both HRAs and HSAs.7 Many 
employers tend to prefer HRAs over HSAs because the account does not need to 
be pre-funded; expenses are paid as claims are incurred. This optimizes cash flow 
and reduces total expenses for many companies. Also, the employer can choose 
to require an employee to pay a portion of the expense prior to the employer’s 
contribution or vice versa. Uniquely, Optima offers employers a number of 
choices in how their HRA is structured to help their employees finance qualified 
medical expenses. Furthermore, Optima created a program where, once a claim 
is adjudicated, the medical provider is paid directly from the employer’s funds for 
eligible expenses; employees don’t have to submit claims forms to have claims paid 
out of the HRA. This minimizes paperwork and assures that a portion of what is 
owed goes to medical providers. Employees have access to secure Web resources to 
monitor their claims, HRA payments, and fund balances. 
7 Health reimbursement accounts and health savings accounts; consumers can invest in these accounts 
through their employer on a pre-tax basis to pay for health care expenses.
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Changing sales-channel payment incentives 
CDHP adoption is also impeded by how brokers are paid. Insurance brokers are 
given a percentage of the annual premium for every policy they sell. Since CDHPs 
have the lowest premiums of all products, brokers are paid the least for selling these 
plans. Optima pays brokers extra fees for customer education. The brokers still make 
more overall selling HMO and PPO products, but the educational fees increase 
their revenues from selling CDHPs and offset some of the costs of educating the 
employers and employees. In all, Optima is taking a multi-faceted approach to 
making CDHPs palatable to physicians, customers, employers, and brokers.
Creating price transparency at point of care
Finally, CDHP adoption is also slow due to a lack of price transparency at the 
point of care. Without clear pricing, patients cannot understand what their costs 
will be when purchasing a CDHP. Cindrich explained, “Customers want price 
transparency right now to get them to purchase CDHPs. This matters more than 
quality information, which patients see as too complex and too far down the road.” 
In response, Sentara has developed a Web-based portal that will give a price estimate 
for any visit or procedure at SMG or the hospital. The patient enters their insurance 
information and the site of care. Within three days, the patient receives a phone 
call with a detailed cost estimate, including co-pays and deductibles. The state of 
Virginia also has a cost comparison portal, which is a Web-based estimator of the 
costs of all hospital-based care. The portal compares the cost of any diagnosis-related 
group across Virginia hospitals.
innovations in the pipeline: patient-centered medical Home 
pilot, chronic disease management pilot, bundled payment 
pilot for joint replacement
Pilots to decrease overall cost of care
In response to regulatory changes that might drive a conversion to capitation, 
Sentara created a “2010 Transformation Agenda.” They are exploring four pilot 
studies in an effort to create an Accountable Care Organization (ACO). Sentara 
prefers to call the pilots experiments in “bundled” or “fixed” payments. Leaders 
avoid using the expression “capitated” to minimize association with failed efforts at 
capitated HMOs in the 1990s. Dr. Maizel explained, “The ACO is the platform for 
how we are going to transform care. What is missing in health care right now is the 
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reimbursement model. So we are experimenting with payment reform, and because 
we have the Optima health plan, we can do that. In the closed system [we are 
creating], the source of dollars is the same, but we are exploring how to distribute 
the dollars differently and how to incent different types of behavior.”
Along with these discussions come potential changes in incentive payment 
structures. Currently, SMG physicians are paid on straight productivity. The practice 
is considering compensating up to 10% of salary based on meeting quality measures 
and exploring how to fit expense management into compensation. Sentara does not 
want to move to a strict capitation model where physicians take on all of the risk of 
cost of care. Dudley explained, “Physicians want to practice medicine. That is why 
they became doctors.” Optima is willing to bear the risk if physicians are willing to 
commit to best practices and manage disease across all points of care.
Patient-centered Medical Home pilot: redesigned primary care
Two primary care practices led by four physicians are experimenting with a 
redesigned office  structure, which began in July of 2010. Physicians will receive a 
per annum fee for participating in the pilot and meeting the clinical and operational 
goals of the new care delivery model. The physicians running the pilot are from 
Sentara Medical Group and the patients are covered by Optima Health. Patients 
will be admitted to Sentara hospitals for all acute care. The goal of the pilot is to 
decrease the expected rate of growth in health care costs by 30% by decreasing 
admissions, ED visits, readmission rates, and overall costs. Staff members’ roles are 
being redefined to allow each physician to expand the population base they are 
managing. Ultimately, the physicians will be paid on a fixed-fee basis to manage 
their patient population.
In the pilot, PCPs will work more closely with registered nurses and physician 
assistants. They will delegate more tasks to staff members, such as scheduling CTs 
and MRIs. Patients will have a designated staff member who acts as a clinical 
coordinator to see that preventive care visits are scheduled and to follow up on any 
acute or chronic conditions to ensure patients are managed appropriately.
Optima will share cost savings with physicians and hospitals and will thus share 
risk with physicians. All visits to specialists and hospitals will be paid on a fee-for-
service basis out of the per annum fee the physician charges Optima. PCPs stand 
to lose money if payments out to specialists and hospitals exceed payments in from 
Optima. Therefore, during the pilot, Optima has agreed to give all the participating 
PCPs extra revenue to ensure that their salaries remain stable. Similarly, Sentara 
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hospitals stand to lose revenues if this PCP pilot decreases admissions. If admissions 
are decreased, Optima will share its cost savings with Sentara hospitals.
Chronic disease management pilot to decrease overall cost of care
A small group of patients with significant chronic disease, who are covered by 
Optima and treated by SMG specialists, have been chosen to participate in a chronic 
disease management pilot. These patients, who will have diabetes or congestive 
heart failure, will work with a care coordinator, primary care doctors, and RNs to 
manage their illness. The goals include an improvement in patient outcomes, a 30% 
reduction in hospitalization, and a 30% decrease in the expected rate of growth in 
health care costs.
Chronic disease management will include follow-up phone calls to remind 
patients to keep their appointments, medication reminders to ensure that patients 
are taking their prescriptions, and case management to manage post-acute care. The 
goal is to link up primary care physicians with telemedicine, nursing homes, home 
care, and hospitals. In this pilot, payment will not be on a fixed-fee basis. Leaders 
expect that case management will decrease hospitalizations and lower the cost of 
care. If this is the case, physicians and hospitals will share bonuses based on the 
degree of expense reduction.
Bundled payment for procedures
Optima and Sentara are currently designing a process to manage bundled pay-
ments for certain clinical procedures. The bundled payment process will involve 
collecting all related claims for the procedure as well as payment distribution to the 
constituents of an ACO—the hospital and defined providers of the care. Optima 
will manage the claims payment and reimbursement distribution process. Sentara is 
currently exploring which procedures are best for bundling payments. Once these 
are defined, clinical teams will look for opportunities within the procedures to share 
savings among providers. Optima may also use this process to serve as a third-party 
administrator for similar bundled claims processing for non-Sentara ACOs.
Exploring customer accountability: advance directives
In an effort to improve quality of life and cost of care at end of life, Sentara is 
implementing a system of advance care planning and encouraging all patients that 
use its hospitals or medical offices to fill out an advance directive. Patients may 
enroll at offices, hospitals or online. Sentara expects that advance care planning will 
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help them manage patient comfort and overall cost of care at both hospitals and 
nursing homes.
iii. learningS
Sentara’s growth highlights many of the issues confronting integrated health care 
systems in the United States. The measure of success of its hospital system is found 
in growing its assets through acquisitions and from growth in volume of admissions 
and procedures. In contrast, the measure of success of its health plan is marked by 
expense management and decreasing overall costs of care. These goals are achieved by 
managing chronic disease to reduce hospitalization and acute care episodes. Sentara 
is now growing its hospital footprint while exploring “transformation of care” 
innovations that aim to decrease hospital admissions. Protecting and developing the 
assets of the hospital system may impede how much the system is able to commit to 
disruptive innovations. In sum, it may be challenging to grow the assets of a hospital 
system in parallel with initiatives that ultimately drive down procedural volume.
the road to integration: more difficult to align systems that start 
as a hospital than systems that start as a health plan
Many Sentara leaders agreed that other integrated systems that start as a health plan 
may have a smoother path to integration. There was consensus that when a business 
begins as a hospital, the hospital is seen as a revenue center. This drives hospitals to 
increase procedural volume—as one leader  said, “Volume is revenue”—and pursue 
higher margin activities, as both increase revenues in a fee-for-service environment. 
Both also increase profits in a system with high fixed costs.
Increasing volume and pursuing higher margin activities is frequently at odds 
with pursuing efficiencies and driving down health care costs. Kaszubowski 
explained, “We manage our costs at the hospitals, but we have not created the 
linkage between primary care and the hospitals.” Recently, Sentara hospitals were 
advertising that they were performing a new artificial cervical disk surgery. Optima 
health plan did not cover the surgery, creating an obvious misalignment between 
the hospitals and the health plan. It is difficult to advocate for moving care to more 
cost-effective venues (i.e. employer sites, e-visits) when hospitals need to cover fixed 
costs. It is difficult to focus on managing the overall cost of care when, historically, 
the hospital has been rewarded for increasing procedural volume. It is also difficult 
to manage chronic disease, as doing so will take patients out of the hospital.
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Also, starting as a hospital drives behaviors that are not necessarily in the best 
interests of an integrated system. Gray described that in 1999, Optima had 40 
employees that “did nothing but adjudicate claims between our hospitals and health 
plan. They eventually worked it out economically, so we stopped it.” The individual 
profit centers of each hospital create incentives to increase revenues that are not 
necessarily aligned with other parts of the system.
In a fee-for-service environment, a hospital system is not rewarded for decreasing 
overall cost of care. Kern rhetorically asked, “If we drop admissions and decrease 
utilization of scans and procedures, have we cut costs? Have we really cut costs? 
No.” Sentara covers its high fixed costs by driving utilization rates at its hospitals. If 
there are successful cost-cutting measures, leaders need to increase market share and 
add procedural volume elsewhere in order to “backfill.”
This alignment issue is evident in Sentara’s emergency departments (EDs). Andy 
Hilbert, chief financial officer, Optima, explained, “I went to a presentation about 
how to reduce ED usage through disease management. The prior presentation was 
about how to increase revenues in the ED. They were presenting a marketing plan 
that advertised a 30-minute wait at Sentara EDs. From a health plan perspective, the 
ED is the worst place for care; it is the most expensive venue. But, for a hospital, the 
ED has huge profit margins.” The ED example illustrates the fact that cost-cutting 
is often at odds with revenue production at a hospital-centered health care system. 
Another alignment issue is that each hospital competes for profitable procedures 
and specialties. When hospitals are evaluated by individual profits and losses, they 
have little incentive to agree on shared resources. For example, the heart hospital 
has some redundancies with other Sentara hospitals. Presumably, some of these 
redundancies are due to the necessity of providing urgent care locally, but other 
redundancies may be due to the profitable nature of cardiac procedures. In general, 
it will be difficult for hospitals to outsource profitable procedures to a center of 
excellence when the procedures are essential to an individual hospital’s bottom line.
Several executives said that until Sentara has shared bottom lines, the units 
will operate at cross-purposes. As one leader said, “Each hospital is still very much 
evaluated by their individual bottom line....We have to change the whole system… 
The technology is there to drive change. The capability is there to drive change. The 
roadblock is politics, relationships and the reimbursement model.”
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financial benefits of partial integration: a hospital system 
benefits from close ties to an insurer and physician practices
Figure 3 explains the models a health care system may assume: non-integrated, 
partly integrated, and fully integrated. This section explores the benefits for Sentara 
of being partly integrated; the following section describes how the marketplace 
values partial integration.
Sentara reaps many benefits from having integrated to also own Optima health 
plan and Sentara Medical Group. Krakaur said, “Optima, the medical group, and 
the hospitals are the three elements of our triangular hedge.” Currently, Sentara has 
approximately $3 billion in revenues, with $2 billion coming from its hospitals and 
$1 billion from the health plan. The medical group operates at a loss of about $6 
million annually without allocated overhead, but has been important in securing 
Health care 
system
Business 
structure
provider 
relationship 
with system
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relationship 
with system
patient 
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Stand-alone 
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or physician 
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to go to hospital or 
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and pays on fee-for-
service basis
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significant part of 
patient volume
Fully integrated 
(also called 
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Figure 3  Non-integrated, partly integrated, and fully integrated  
                health care systems
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hospital admissions. It may also be important for revenue production if reform 
drives a switch to capitated or fixed-fee payments. Krakaur explained, “We will 
need to demonstrate to the government that we can manage the health of larger 
groups of the population. If we are caring for 4 million people in Virginia [through 
our hospital base and we have a health plan and a medical group], we can take 
capitation on that population.”
As an integrated system, Sentara can test innovations on a small, closed 
scale. Kaszubowski explained that Sentara is trying to understand new payment 
methodologies: “How do you get a payment for managing a population? How 
do you divvy up hospital, physician, and long-term care payments? An integrated 
deliverer can try out things in an attempt to answer these questions.” If successful, 
they can scale up either internally or through relationships with other payers.
Why Sentara has not pursued full integration
Leadership prefers partial integration
Sentara leaders are in agreement that, for now, Sentara should remain partially 
integrated rather than become a closed, staff-model HMO. “The experiment 
with MaxiCare left a bad taste in our mouth with regard to staff-model HMOs,” 
explained one executive, “and that has made us very cautious about closed systems.” 
In addition, Sentara explored bundled payments with cardiologists at its hospitals 
in the late 1990s. That experiment “ended badly,” said Yates, and damaged 
relationships with cardiologists for some time afterwards. Bernd explained, “Being 
fully integrated might be easier but we have been successful at partial integration. 
With the financing element Optima provides, we can partner with physicians who 
are not employed and create the right incentives in the hospital to streamline care. 
We have aligned incentives between Sentara and contracted physicians through 
our focus on outcomes and quality-based incentives.” Maizel feels the decision to 
remain partly integrated is important: “I do not want to move in the direction of 
being a closed system, [closer to] our insurer. I have a bias, in that I do not know 
what the insurer brings to the equation… We are also very active with the AMGA 
[American Medical Group Association], who does not feel like you need to own 
a payer. They also don’t believe a hospital needs to be part of your ACO because 
a hospital is a cost center.” Finally, some leaders think that the partially integrated 
system may be more cost-effective than a closed system. Heuser explained, “The 
ACO model [under a fully integrated, staff-model HMO] looks great, but if you 
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go to that, in some cases it will be more expensive. After you pay for the EMR and 
ensure quality, costs may increase.”
Providers prefer to work for partially integrated vs. closed systems
Physicians historically have had the dominant position in deciding relationships and 
pricing. Heuser explained that locally, “providers have a lot of power” to set pricing 
and have not wanted to join closed groups. Physicians in a nearby market had 
expressed dissatisfaction with a closed system set up by Carilion Clinic in Roanoke, 
Virginia. Employed medical groups were historically perceived as offering a lower 
salary, less autonomy, and requiring physicians to practice cookbook medicine. 
In order to bring physicians in-house, executives said that Sentara “overpaid” for 
physician practices. Yates said, “We have many contracted physicians, and they do 
not want a closed system because that would disturb relationships. Any arrangements 
we have need to be perceived as fair by physicians. Sentara tells physicians they can 
relate to our health system in a variety of ways and we have to pick the right vehicles 
for that to happen.” Szalwinski went further, saying, “You could say we are leaving 
our options open as far as our relationships with physicians, but you could also say 
we are forced by the market to have certain relationships.”
Consumer dislike of closed networks
Perhaps most importantly, the local market has dissuaded Sentara from pursuing 
full integration. As Kern explained, “The marketplace in Virginia is not interested 
in a closed network. Payers and employers want a broad, robust network.” Gray 
concurred with, “The customer in Virginia is not comfortable with ‘bigness’ or 
with what is perceived as a closed system.” Multiple leaders referenced the fact 
that the customer base is wary of “bigness.” For example, Optima used a different 
name for its health plan in order to avoid full association with Sentara. When asked 
whether the marketplace might value the quality outcomes that a highly integrated 
system could deliver, several leaders supported Dudley’s comment that, “Right now, 
employers are concerned about price. Quality is second to price concerns.”
Sentara’s mission also includes serving its local community, which includes 
taking on Medicaid and Medicare recipients. Kern explained, “Given our 
community responsibility, we have [remained open and] have a number of different 
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kinds of relationships. Compared with a Kaiser which does not have a significant 
representation of Medicaid patients, we serve our community, and that means 
taking patients from multiple insurers.”8
Because Sentara takes payment from outside Optima, Sentara hospitals can 
serve nearly an entire local population. Sentara maintains flexible relationships with 
multiple external payers to generate patient volume. Sentara is also keeping an open 
mind about how contracts will be structured with these payers in the future. Yates 
explained, “Now, reimbursement is going to change and the timing is different. My 
sense is that Medicare will be more willing to work with us. Anthem, the largest 
private payer, will be watching our pilots. We might be able to work with them 
around specific diagnoses… It seems like payers need stages to be led into things.” 
He continued, “Anthem has a lot to lose if they miss an opportunity to partner 
with us in creating new payment structures.” Sentara has cultivated a reputation in 
the marketplace as a provider network willing to work with all payers and explore 
different pricing arrangements. This flexibility and market would be lost if Sentara 
were to become a closed system.
Changes in marketplace may move Sentara toward integration
If integration is considered on a spectrum, Sentara has historically remained 
closer to the non-integrated end of the spectrum than the fully integrated end. 
Historically, consumers, providers, and payers in the local market have preferred 
more choice and a less integrated delivery system. There are many indications that 
these market forces are changing. “The younger generation of physicians is better 
at understanding [salaried positions],” Bernd said. Consumers are more focused 
on price, and payers may switch to fixed-fee payment models. As physicians, 
consumers, and payers evolve and policy changes, there is consensus that tighter 
integration may follow (see Figure 4).
avoiding the managed care failures of the 1990s
Sentara believes that physicians should not have to manage the risk of fixed-fee 
payment models. In the  HMO model of the ’90s, physicians had to drive down 
8 Kaiser Permanente takes very limited numbers of Medicare and Medicaid enrollees. Other not-for-
profit health plans generally have a larger proportion of Medicare and Medicaid enrollees.
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costs and maintain quality without the necessary incentives or support to do so. 
Heuser believes that physicians want to practice medicine “the way they are taught 
to practice medicine; that is what they are best at.” Yates added that Sentara is 
thinking about “how the system and the physician can become accountable. And, 
what are the legal and system structures that support that?” Sentara believes in 
aligning incentives to best share the risks of managing costs and maintaining quality 
with physicians and patients.
impact of health care reform
Sentara sees itself at a crossroads between two policy environments, and therefore, 
two business models. The first model is the current fee-for-service system that 
encourages hospitalization and high utilization. Meaningful reform might spur 
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Figure 4  Market forces that might move an integrated delivery 
                 system toward greater integration
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the second model of fixed-fee payments, increase chronic disease management and 
create a significant reduction in hospital utilization.
Leaders are in agreement regarding the need for policy reform, and echoed 
Bernd, who said, “The system is broken.” There is consensus at Sentara that there 
are two main drivers of change to policy reform. The first driver will be making the 
switch from fee-for-service to fixed-fee pricing. Kern emphasized, “It is no longer 
about optimizing financial performance. We can do all sorts of things to manage 
the cost of care, but these are one-offs. It is about fixing the system.” The second 
driver will be increasing patient responsibility for health. “We incent people to be 
sick. Until we change that, we cannot change anything else,” explained Szalwinski. 
There is also consensus that reform has to happen first. Szalwinski added, “I think 
payment reform will drive model reform and will drive care-delivery reform. My 
prediction is that if we go to bundled payment, the mechanics of divvying up the 
payment will be easier under an employed situation. Where is Sentara as far as 
preparation? We’re at the thinking and piloting phase, not implementation. But 
we do have Optima, who knows how to absorb money and distribute it.” Finally, 
Bernd explained that reform may drive providers towards integration: “I cannot say 
we would never become fully integrated… Especially if we see Congress making 
large reimbursement cuts, then we will see massive integration.”
Leadership is wary that impending insurance exchanges required by the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act will devalue the quality Sentara focuses on. 
Hilbert explained, “Exchanges have a huge selection risk. The more you migrate 
towards an exchange, the more you become a commodity and the less important the 
integrated system. Through an exchange, you are not telling the story of continuity 
of care and having the data to manage chronic disease. Compare that to brokers 
selling integrated systems to large employers. Brokers can explain the benefits of 
integration well.”
preparing for change
Sentara may expand geographically through further hospital acquisition. As 
Krakaur explained, “We have had many more opportunities to grow than the board 
permitted us to act on in the past. Now our goals have changed and we may be able 
to grow a lot more… Getting our hospital revenues to $3 billion brings us much 
better scale as far as the supply chain. Right now, we are at $2 billion in revenues 
from the hospitals. Also, we need to demonstrate to the government that we can 
manage the health of larger groups of the population.” Krakaur believes that growth 
Sentara may 
expand 
geographically 
through further 
hospital acquisition.
Sentara Healthcare  |  32
NSTITUTE
NNOSIGHT
in hospital systems is intensely regional, saying, “A lot of people debate what is the 
best strategy for growth, but it ends up being market-specific.” Finally, he explained 
that the marketplace historically cuts rates and “in the absence of the ability to raise 
prices, if you do not grow, you will die.” Sentara expects to increase its hospital 
footprint to maintain revenues, increase scale and position itself to negotiate with 
payers if reform changes the marketplace.
Innovations at Sentara can be grouped by their associated revenue risk (see 
Figure 5). 
IT innovation would be classified as less risky, as it requires a capital outlay 
at the outset, which can be recouped or depreciated over time. In comparison, 
committing to fixed-fee payment structures or bundling are high-risk innovations, 
requiring business-model risk. Sentara is assessing the right market conditions 
before committing to pricing innovations. Kern summarized, “Payment reform is 
going to drive health care reform. In the meantime, we are making money in the 
straddle.” Sentara will continue to operate a fee-for-service, hospital-based health 
care system while positioning itself to best respond to policy reform. In the process, 
Sentara may move toward a more highly integrated structure. Yates expressed his 
optimism regarding the potential of integration when he said, “My sense is that 
integrated systems have scratched at the surface of what is possible.”
Figure 5  Categorizing innovation at Sentara: progress in 
                innovation compared with revenue risk
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Appendix A  Sentara hospitals
Hospital
date 
acquired
number  
of beds
location notable characteristics
Sentara Norfolk 
General Hospital
Merged in 1972. 
Adopted Sentara 
name in 1982.
525 Norfolk, VA (SE)
Level I Trauma Center, Burn 
unit, Sentara Heart Hospital-
within-a-Hospital
Sentara Leigh 
Hospital 250 Norfolk, VA (SE)
Cited in 2001 & 2002 
as top performer in “100 
Top Hospital National 
Benchmarks”
Sentara CarePlex 
Hospital 1988 200 Hampton, VA (SE)
One of the busiest 
emergency depts. in state, 
bariatric surgery
Sentara Bayside 
Hospital 1991 158 Virginia Beach, VA (SE)
Plan to move to all-
outpatient hospital plus 
24-hour Emergency Room 
by 2011
Sentara Virginia 
Beach General 
Hospital 1998 274
Virginia Beach, VA 
(SE)
Cited in 2001 & 2002 
as top performer in “100 
Top Hospital National 
Benchmarks”
Sentara Williamsburg 
Regional Medical 
Center 2002 (affiliation 
began in 1996) 145
Williamsburg, VA 
(SE)
6 years with no cases 
of ventilator-associated 
pneumonia. Top 10 
in Leapfrog Hospital 
Recognition Program. 
Patient-centered healing 
under PlaneTree model.
Sentara Obici 
Hospital 2006 150 Suffolk, VA (SE)
Sentara Potomac 
Hospital 2009 183
Woodbridge, VA 
(Northern)
Acquisition included 
ambulatory campuses
Martha Jefferson 
Hospital 2010 176
Charlottesville, VA 
(Central)
Merger expected to be final 
in mid-2011
Rockingham 
Memorial Hospital 2010 238 Harrisonburg, VA (North/Central)
July 2010: signed letter of 
intent to affiliate; merger 
may be final by 1st quarter 
of 2011
Sentara Princess Anne Under 
construction 120
Virginia Beach, VA 
(SE) Scheduled to open in 2011
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